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INTRODUCTION
European Union ("EU" or "Union") law and the law of
international arbitration have traditionally occupied largely
separate worlds, as if arbitral tribunals would rarely be the fora
for the resolution of EU law claims and as if EU law, in turn, had
little concern with arbitration. For several reasons, this pattern
has recently been altered, although the relationship between EU
* Jean Monnet Professor of European Union Law and Walter Gellhorn Professor
of Law, Columbia Law School; regular visiting professor, College d'Europe, Bruges.
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law and international arbitration law is at present anything but
settled. From the present perspective, the past looks like an age
of innocence, for as these two worlds have begun to intersect,
they have not done so entirely harmoniously.
Part I of this Essay traces the traditional divide between EU
law and the law of international arbitration. This Essay then
identifies two developments, both emanating from the EU-law
side of the equation, that are in the process of altering this
landscape. The first, discussed in Part II, is the prospective
amendment on arbitration to the Brussels Regulation on
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments; the second,
discussed in Part III, is the transfer of exclusive competence over
policy in the area of foreign direct investment, itself a developing
arena of international arbitration, to the EU from the Member
States. Because both developments are so nascent, it is difficult to
gauge the magnitude of the problems they may create, much less
delineate the steps required to mitigate them. At this early stage,
this Essay simply draws attention to the new realities and to the
nature of the challenges they present.
I.

THE DISTANT WORLDS OFEUAND INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION LAW

EU law and international arbitration law have long failed to
intersect, almost as if the two fields were mutually indifferent.
This state of affairs owes more to traditional assumptions made
by EU law than to any made by the law of international
arbitration.
A.

EU Law and PivateInternationalLaw

The law of the European Union has long ranged over a wide
variety of fields. From the start, constitutional and administrative
law occupied a central place in the landscape, alongside a host of
domains that EU law from early on specifically addressed:
agriculture, fisheries, and transport law, as well as competition
law, among others. Treaty amendments later brought whole new
subjects within the purview of EU law, environmental' and

1. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 191, 2010 O.J. C 83/47, at 132-33 [hereinafter TFEU].
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consumer protection 2 being only the most conspicuous
examples. Of course, the fundamental Community objectivethe common market, and later the internal market-brought EU
law into virtually any field in which harmonization of Member
State law might conduce a more fully integrated marketA Product
liability was the paradigmatic example.4
From other fields, however, EU law long kept its distance.
Criminal law comes to mind, but so too does private
international law. The original Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community strongly suggested that harmonization of
rules among the Member States on matters of private
international law required a convention outside the Community
law system, 5 and the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction
and the Recognition of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters ("Brussels Convention")s took precisely that form. With
the Maastricht Treaty, private international law was brought
within the ambit of EU law, but relegated to the third, nonCommunity law pillar on justice and home affairs. 7 Only with the
Treaty of Amsterdam did it become part of Community law
proper.8 Thus, until relatively recently, the distance between EU
law and international arbitration reflected a much larger divide
between EU law and private international law.
B.

The Brussels Convention and Regulation

The 1968 Brussels Convention is an instrument that
addressed core issues of private international law, but did so
2. See id. art. 169, at 124.
3. See id. art. 114, at 94-95.
4. See Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the Approximation of the Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability
for Defective Products, 1985 O.J. L 210, amended by Directive 1999/34/EC of the
Parliament and Council on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and
Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective
Products, 1999 O.J. L 141/20.
5. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art.
220(4), 298 U.N.T.S. 11, at 87 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
6. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, 1998 O.J. C 27/1 (hereinafter Brussels Convention].
7. See Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992, Title VI, 1992
O.J. C 191/1, at 61-62 [hereinafter Maastricht TEU].
8. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
art. 65, 1997 O.J. C 340/173, at 203 [hereinafter EC Treaty 1997 Consolidated Version]
(as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam).
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strictly outside the Community law framework. 9 In fact, due to an
express exclusion from coverage, neither of the convention's two
main pillars-mutual limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction
over domiciliaries of other Member States and the reciprocal
obligation to recognize and enforce each others' judgments in
civil and commercial matters-had any application to
arbitration.10 It would already have been abundantly clear from
the terms in which it was couched that the convention did not
address the exercise of jurisdiction by arbitral tribunals or the
recognition or enforcement of awards." But the exclusion went
much further. Although the matter is subject to some doubt, the
convention was largely understood also to exclude questions of
judicial jurisdiction and the recognition or enforcement of
judicial judgments insofar as the underlying claim or judgment
directly related to arbitration. Accordingly, neither suits to
enforce arbitration agreements, nor actions for interim relief in
aid of arbitration, nor actions for the annulment of awards, nor
suits to enforce a foreign arbitral award, nor indeed any civil or
commercial litigation directly concerning arbitration fell within
the scope of the convention, even though such litigation might in
every other respect meet the conditions required for the
convention's application. This supposition on the part of
national courts was eventually confirmed by the Court of Justice
of the European Union ("Court" or "Court ofJustice") in its West
Tankers judgment,1 2 rendered in 2009, well after the Brussels
Convention had been transformed into EU legislation proper.'3
The exclusion was not irrational. By the time of the Brussels
Convention, the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (or New York
Convention)1 4 was already a decade old. Although the New York
Convention did not, and still does not, comprehensively govern
the role of courts in relation to arbitration agreements and

9. Brussels Convention, supra note 6.
10. Id. art. 1, 1 4, at 4 ("The Convention shall not apply to ... arbitration.").
11. See generally id. arts. 2-45, at 4-14.
12. Allianz SpA v. West Tankers Inc., Case C-185/07, [2009] E.C.R. 1-663.
13. Council Regulation 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters art. 1(2), 2001 O.J. L 12/1,
at 3.
14. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
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arbitral awards, it addressed the core issues, namely the
obligation of national courts to refer parties to arbitration 15 and
to afford recognition and enforcement to foreign awards.16 But
rather than try to delineate exactly what issues the New York
Convention left over for regulation at the European level, the
Brussels Convention created a categorical carve-out for
arbitration." This left the Brussels Convention with plenty of
terrain to cover, but arbitration was not part of it. When the
convention became transformed into secondary EU legislation in
("Brussels
44/2001
of Council Regulation
the form
Regulation"), 18 the carve-out remained.19
The Brussels Regulation is currently the subject of proposed
revisions. In light of the controversy stirred by West Tankers,20 the
European Commission ("Commission") has proposed, among
other things, integrating arbitration into the Brussels Regulation
regime.2 1 The outcome remains uncertain.2 2
C.

Authority to Make PreliminaryReferences

Among the ways in which EU law penetrates the Member
States' legal orders is through the mechanism of the preliminary

15. Id. art. II, at 38-40.
16. Id. art. III, at 40.
17. See Brussels Convention, supra note 6, art. 1, at 4.
18. See generally Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 13.
19. Id. art. 1(2) (d), at 3.
20. Allianz SpA v. West Tankers Inc., Case C-185/07, [2009] E.C.R. 1-663.
21. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters (Recast), at 4-6, COM (2010) 748 Final (Dec. 14, 2010). The
proposal would require a Member State court to stay its proceedings if its jurisdiction is
contested on the basis of an arbitration agreement and an arbitral tribunal has been
seised of the case or court proceedings relating to the arbitration agreement have been
commenced in the Member State of the seat of the arbitration. According to the
proposal, this modification "will enhance the effectiveness of arbitration agreements in
Europe, prevent parallel court and arbitration proceedings, and eliminate the incentive
for abusive litigation tactics." Id. at 8-9.
22. In its Green Paper, the Commission proposed a full or partial deletion of the
arbitration exclusion so as to bring all court proceedings in support of arbitration within
the scope of the Regulation, possibly coupled with a grant of exclusive jurisdiction for
such proceedings to the courts of the Member State of the place of arbitration.
Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on the Review of Council
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, at 8-9, COM (2009) 175 Final (Apr. 21,
2009).
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reference-a means by which national courts may, and on
occasion must, refer questions to the Court of Justice on the
interpretation and validity of EU law when necessary to dispose
of cases before them.2 3 The details of this device, which has been
part of the procedural landscape from the very start of the
European Economic Community in 1958, need not concern the
reader here. Importantly, preliminary references have given the
Court of Justice extraordinary opportunities to expound
authoritatively on EU law and a basis for supposing that Member
State courts, having suspended proceedings to make the
reference, would follow the Court's rulings upon resuming
them. 24 Moreover, the Court's preliminary rulings-though
issued in the context of a particular referral-have carried as
much precedential weight for future cases in national courts as
any other judgment of the Court.2 5
The relevant treaty provision contemplates preliminary
references from a "court or tribunal of a Member State." 26 The
Court of Justice early on took the position that arbitral tribunals,
though sitting in the territory of a Member State and governed
by that state's law of arbitration, did not constitute tribunals of a
Member State.2 7 Thus, they could not request preliminary rulings
from the Court of Justice on the meaning or validity of EU law
even if the dispute before them raised such issues, even
importantly.28 This was a perfectly reasonable and indeed the
more probable reading of the treaty. However, it did mean that,
even when a cause of action in arbitration not only entailed
application of EU law but actually arose under EU law, the
tribunal was left to its own devices in coming to a proper
understanding of the relevant EU law norms.2 9
Though regrettable from the perspective of ensuring EU
law's maximal efficacy, the situation was not dire. First, advocates
appearing before arbitral tribunals could be counted on to

23. TFEU, supranote 1, art. 267, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 164.
24. GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW
321-24 (3d ed. 2010).
25. Id.
26. TFEU, supra note 1, art. 267, 2010 0.J. C 83, at 164.
27. See Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei
GmbH v. Reederei Mond
Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG, Case 102/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1095, 1 10, 13.
28. See id. It 14-15.
29. See id.
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educate those tribunals reasonably well about the contours of EU
law, as appropriate, leaving the tribunals without the benefit of
direct rulings from the Court in those cases, but seldom leaving
them in the dark. Second-and the Court took specific note of
this fact-if and when arbitration agreements, arbitral measures,
or arbitral awards happened to come before Member State courts
for one reason or another, those courts, being "courts or
tribunals of Member States," would have standing to make any
appropriate references.3 0 In fact, arbitration agreements, arbitral
measures, and arbitral awards commonly come before national
courts in the context of civil or commercial litigation. Those
proceedings may have fallen into a carve-out from the Brussels
Convention, but they are not excluded from the EU's
preliminary reference mechanism*31
Assuming the Court's reading of the preliminary reference
mechanism to be correct, the fact remains that the constitutive
treaties, which have been fundamentally revised on several
occasions over the years, could readily have been amended to
bring arbitral tribunals within the category of tribunals
authorized to make preliminary references to the Court. That
step was never taken. Even as the Commission was urging private
parties to bring claims for damages against enterprises for their
violations of EU competition law,32 knowing that at least some of
those claims would be found to fall within the ambit of a broadly
drafted arbitration clause, the carve-out remained intact.
The EU itself has thus been responsible for much of the
distance dividing EU law and international arbitration practice.
For its part, the international arbitration community had no
particular interest in maintaining that separation but could not
itself do much about it.33 In any event, neither the Brussels
Convention's and the Brussels Regulation's exclusion of judicial
proceedings concerning arbitration nor arbitrators' inability to
make references to the Court prevented international arbitration
30. Id.
31. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Nordsee Deutsch, [1982] E.C.R.

1095,

1 14-15.

32. See generally Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on
Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165 Final (Apr. 2,

2008).
33. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text (discussing the New York
Convention).
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from entering into and remaining in a "golden age."3 4 EU law's
and arbitration's coexistence, though awkward and even
unnatural, prevailed.

II. NEWINTERSECTIONS: A VIOLATION OFEULA WAS A
PUBLIC POLICY DEFENSE
The landscape described above is, of late, changing in
potentially dramatic ways, though its new contours are not yet
clear. First, the Court of Justice has advanced a highly robust
concept of European Union public policy. 5 This is a
development with obvious implications for the outcome of
actions to annul arbitral awards or to secure their recognition or
enforcement.36 Second, the Lisbon Treaty,3 7 having made
regulation of foreign direct investment an exclusive competence
of the EU, opens up still another front on which EU law
imperatives may operate to alter the international arbitration
landscape, in this case, the rapidly growing field of investor-state
arbitration.3 8
There is nothing new in public policy constituting a ground
upon which an otherwise proper arbitral award may be annulled
in a court of the arbitral situs or denied recognition or
enforcement elsewhere. That is standard fare, as evidenced by
the New York Convention itself,39 the United Nations
Commission on International Trade ("UNCITRAL") Model
Law,* and the positive law of just about every jurisdiction in the
world that experiences arbitration. 4 1 (Under the Brussels

34. See Amr Shalakany, Book Review, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 576, 577 (1998) (reviewing
RIcHARD B LILLICH & CHARLES N. BROWER, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST
CENTURY: TOWARDS 'JUDICIALISATION' AND UNIFORMITY? (1994)); Caroline S. Richard,
Washington, DC: ITA-ASIL Conference-Arbitration:The End of the Golden Age, GLOB. ARB.
REV., Apr. 27, 2010, at 36, 36-37.
35. See infra Part II.A.2.
36. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text; see also infra Part II.A.2.
37. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, 2007 O.J. C 306/01 [hereinafter Lisbon Treaty].
38. See infra Part III.
39. New York Convention, supra note 14, art. V(2) (b).
40. U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, art. 34(2) (b) (ii), U.N. Doc. A/40/17/Annex I Oune 21, 1985)
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law].
41. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2620-33 (3d ed.
2009).
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Regulation, it is even a ground on which a Member State court
may withhold recognition or enforcement of another Member
State's judgments. 4 2 ) Specifically, a Member State court may deny
recognition or enforcement of a foreign award-even one
rendered on the territory of another Member State-for
violation of the former's public policy.43
A.

The Notion ofEU Public Policy

EU Member States, like states generally, enjoy freedom to
determine what does and does not rise to the level of public
policy within their respective legal orders. If state sovereignty has
any meaning at all, this must be among its features. However, the
EU Member States find themselves in a peculiar position vis-1-vis
public policy, due to the partial surrender of sovereignty that EU
membership is commonly assumed to entail. The Court ofJustice
has taken the firm position that Member States must take EU law
into account in determining what constitutes public policy within
their legal orders. The setting in which the Court made this claim
most explicit was none other than arbitration. In Eco Swiss, the
Court ruled, among other things, that if a Member State treats
offense to public policy as a ground for annulling a local award, it
must equally treat offense to EU public policy as such a ground.44
The Court readily found EU competition policy, practically as an
entire field, entitled to public policy treatment in the context of
award annulment at the national level. 45
The Court might have predicated this requirement on a
generalized proposition that EU law takes primacy over national
law. However, EU law primacy is a politically potent assertion that
the Member States have never been fully willing to inscribe
expressly in the founding treaties 46 and one that certainly has not
42. Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 13, art. 34(1), at 10.
43. See, e.g., id.; New York Convention, supra note 14, art. V(2)(b); UNCITRAL
Model Law, supra note 40, art. 34(2) (b) (ii).
44. Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int'l NV, Case C-126/97, [1999] E.C.R.
1-3055, 1 37.
45. Id. 11 36-40. For reaffirmation of competition law's "public policy" status, see
de
Nederlandse
bestuur van
van
Raad
BV v.
Netherlands
T-Mobile
Mededingingsautoriteit, Case C-8/08, [2009] E.C.R. 1-4529, 1 49; Manfredi v. Lloyd
Adriatico Assicurazioni SpAJoined Cases C-295-98/04, [2006] ECR 1-6619, 31.
46. A "primacy clause" has only appeared in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution
for Europe, art. 1-6, 2004 O.J. C 310/1, at 12 ("The Constitution and law adopted by the
institutions of the Union in exercising competences conferred on it shall have primacy
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gone uncontested among the Member States.4 7 The Court thus
found a safer basis for this claim in the so-called "principle of
equivalence." 48 The Court had announced this principle
essentially as a general proviso to an even more general principle
that the Member States enjoy "procedural autonomy" in
determining the ways in which their judiciaries implement and
enforce EU law in cases coming before them. 49 The Court had
made its concession of Member State procedural autonomy
subject to two important limiting principles. One such norm was
precisely the principle of equivalence, according to which
Member States courts are not permitted to discriminate
procedurally against legal claims derived from EU law as
compared to their treatment of analogous claims derived from
domestic law.50 Through this "national treatment" rule of sorts,
the Court sought to ensure that EU-law-based claims would
receive no less favorable procedural consideration in the courts
of Member States than comparable domestic law claims
received.5 ' (The Court's other limiting principle was the
"principle of effectiveness," according to which a Member State
must in any event make available to individuals relying on EU law
procedures and remedies that are adequate to ensure their
enjoyment of the benefits that EU law affords them.5 2 )
The Court's requirement in Eco Swiss that Member State
courts give no less weight to EU public policy than to national
public policy in the context of actions for the annulment of

over the law of the Member States."). That instrument never entered into force due to
negative referenda in several Member States. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 24, at 28,
244-45. The Treaty of Lisbon did not carry such a provision into either the Treaty on
European Union or the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. See id. at
244-45.
47. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 24, at 279-310.
48. See Van Schijndel v. Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten, Joined
t 13, 17; Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG v.
Cases C-430-431/93, [1995] E.C.R. 14705,
Landwirtschaftskammer ffir das Saarland (Cassis de Dijon), Case 33/76, [1976] E.C.R.
1989, 1 5.
49. See Van Schijndel, (19951 E.C.R. 1-4705, 11 13, 17; Cassis de Dijon, [19761 E.C.R.
1989, 1 5.
50. See Van Schijndel, [1995] E.C.R 14705, 1 13, 17; Cassis de Dijon, [1976] E.C.R.
1989, 1 5.
13, 17; Cassis de Dijon, [1976] E.C.R
51. Van Schindel, [1995] E.C.R. 14705,
1989, 1 5.
13, 17; Cassis de Dijon, [1976] E.C.R.
52. Van Schijndel, [1995] E.C.R. 14705,
1989, 1 5.
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arbitral awards is in fact little more than a corollary of the
principle of equivalence, and to that extent is not particularly
remarkable. But applying the principle of equivalence to public
policy has vastly greater consequences than applying it to such
purely procedural matters as the statute of limitations or rules on
standing to sue. How far-reaching, after all, is EU public policy?
More specifically, when is an EU law norm "merely" an EU law
norm, and when does it attain the status of EU public policy?
Might all of EU law constitute EU public policy? The stakes are
considerable.
Applying the principle of equivalence to public policy in the
arbitration context raises other complications as well. Courts are
generally assumed to have authority to raise public policy sua
sponte as a ground for setting aside or refusing recognition or
enforcement of an arbitral award. The New York Convention5 3
and the UNCITRAL Model Law5 4 make that quite clear.
However, it is also widely thought that none of the Model Law or
convention grounds for setting aside or refusing recognition or
enforcement of an award-not even public policy-is mandatory,
in the sense that a court has no choice but to set aside or deny
recognition or enforcement once the ground is established.55
Rather, courts may-though they are highly unlikely to do sochoose to refrain from setting aside an award or from denying it
recognition or enforcement even though they conclude that the
award or its enforcement would offend public policy.56 But may
53. See New York Convention, supra note 14, art. V(2) (b) ("Recognition and
enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the
country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that ... (b) The recognition
or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country."
(emphasis added)). Most of the grounds for denying recognition or enforcement of an
award under the convention are preceded by the language: "Recognition and
enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused, at the request of the party against
whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the
recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that. . . ." Id. art. V(1) (emphasis added).
54. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 40, art. 34(2) (b) (ii) ("An arbitral award
may be set aside ... only if:. . . (b) the court finds that ...

(ii) the award is in conflict with

the public policy of this State." (emphasis added)). Most of the grounds for denying
recognition or enforcement of an award under the Model Law are preceded by the
language "An arbitral award may be set aside ... only if (a) the party making the
application furnishes proof that ..... Id. art. 34(2) (a) (emphasis added).
55. The operative term in the New York Convention and in the UNCITRAL Model
Law is the permissive "may." See supra notes 53-54.
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF T4E U.S. LAw OF INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §
5-14(a) & cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2010) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
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Member State courts truly treat violation of EU public policy in
that fashion? It is doubtful that they may, even though the
principle of equivalence would seem to allow it. If this is so-i.e.,
if Member State courts may in the arbitration context "overlook"
violations of domestic public policy, but may in no event
"overlook" violations of EU public policy-then EU law will, to
that extent, have turned the New York Convention's and the
UNCITRAL Model Law's public policy ground from a permissive
one into a mandatory one.
B.

hat ConstitutesEU Public Policy?

Cases that have arisen since Eco Swiss have required the
Court of Justice to start tracing more seriously the perimeters of
EU public policy in the arbitration setting. In Mostaza Claro v.
Centro M6vil Milenium,5 7 the Court was asked to decide whether a
Member State court hearing an action to set aside an award was
required to determine whether the arbitration agreement that
founded its jurisdiction to hear the case was unfair and
unenforceable under the provisions of Directive 93/13 on unfair
clauses in consumer contracts, 5 8 even if the respondent consumer
never raised that claim during the arbitration.59 In that case, a
Spanish telecom company initiated arbitration against Mostaza
Claro on account of its failure to comply with the minimum
contractual period of its subscription. Although it had, by
contract with the company, the right to insist on ajudicial forum,
it appeared in the arbitration without jurisdictional objection
and interposed a defense, losing on the merits. At that point,
Mostaza Claro brought annulment proceedings, arguing that the
arbitration agreement from which the award stemmed was
invalid under EU law because it was an unfair contract term
within the meaning of Directive 93/13.60 The national court felt
called upon to revisit one of the questions that had arisen in Eco
Swiss and on which a preliminary reference had been made in
that case, but one which the Court of Justice in Eco Swiss had
57. Mostaza Claro v. Centro M6vil Milenium, Case C-168/05, [2006] E.C.R. I10,421.
58. Council Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 1993
O.J. L 95/29.
59. See Mostaza Claro, [2006] E.C.R. 1-10,421, 1 20.
60. See id. 18.
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found unnecessary to answer.6' (Since the annulment action in
Eco Swiss was time barred under national law, and since
application of the national limitations period offended neither
the principle of equivalence nor the principle of effectiveness,
the annulment action could not in any event go forward.) 62 The
question was a straightforward one: Must a Member State court
in an action to annul an arbitral award entertain a claim that an
arbitration agreement is void even if the party making that claim
failed to raise that claim at any time during the arbitral
proceedings themselves?
The Court of Justice's reasoning in Mostaza Claro built
largely on its prior decision in Odano Grupo EditorialSA v. Rocio
Murciano Quintero,63 a case not involving arbitration. In Ociano
Grupo, a Member State court had been debating whether to
invalidate a forum selection clause in a consumer contract that
designated a court of the seller's place of business as the
exclusive forum, on the ground that the clause was unfair within
the meaning of Directive 93/13, despite the consumer's failure
to raise that issue. 64 (The forum selection clause furnished the
national court its only basis for jurisdiction.) The Court held in
Ocano Grupo that Member State courts are required to raise such
a question sua sponte if necessary, specifically basing that result
on the principle of effectiveness. 65 It described Article 6(1),
which prohibited Member States courts from treating an unfair
term as binding on the consumer, 66 as "a mandatory provision"
and as "essential to the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to
the Community and, in particular to raising the standard of living
and the quality of life in the territory."6 7 The Court analogized
the directive's importance to the EU to the importance it had
61. See id. 20; see also Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int'l NV, Case C126/97, [1999] E.C.R. 1-3055, 11 30, 42.
43-48.
62. See Eco Swiss, [1999] E.C.R. 1-3055,
63. Oceano Grupo Editorial SA v. Rocfo Murciano Quintero, Joined Cases C-24044/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-4941.
64. See id. 1 15-19.
65. See id. It 25-29.
66. See Council Directive 93/13/EEC, supra note 58, art. 6(1) ("Member States
shall lay down that unfair terms used in a contract concluded with a consumer by a seller
or supplier shall, as provided for under their national law, not be binding on the
consumer and that the contract shall continue to bind the parties upon those terms if it
is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair terms.").
67. See Mostaza Claro, [2006] E.C.R. 1-10,421, 1 36-37.
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ascribed in Eco Swiss to competition law and concluded that the
effectiveness of Article 6(1) would be frustrated if Member State
courts required the consumer himself or herself to challenge a
contractual term's fairness. 68 The Court reaffirmed Ociano Grupo
on several occasions thereafter, both in connection with Directive
93/1369 and with other consumer protection instruments. 70
Thus, largely on the Ociano Grupo precedent, the Court in
Mostaza Claro ruled that the mere failure of a party to raise the
fairness issue in arbitration did not excuse the annulment court
from raising that issue on its own motion.7 1 Presumably, the
principle of effectiveness required the Member State court not
only to raise the issue sua sponte, but also to annul an award if it
found the arbitration agreement to be unfair within the meaning
of the directive.
In Mostaza Claro, the Court relied secondarily on the
principle of equivalence, holding in effect that that principle
required the national legal order to give as full effect to EU
public policy as it gives to domestic public policy.
[W]here its domestic rules of procedure require a national
court to grant an application for annulment of an arbitration
award where such an application is founded on failure to
observe national rules of public policy, it must also grant
such an application where it is founded on failure to comply

with Community rules of this type.72
The Court was less than fully clear on whether Spanish law itself
required a court to raise a national public policy even though the
consumer failed to do so, but presumably it did, or else the
principle of equivalence would not justify the result that the
Court reached. A fair reading of the case thus suggests that if any
right is so fundamental under domestic law that public policy
treats it as unwaivable, then an equally fundamental right under
EU law must, as a matter of public policy, be treated as
unwaivable as well. Presumably, the Court ofJustice would decide
68. See id. 11 37-39.
69. See, e.g., Pannon GSM Zrt v. Gy6rfi, Case C-243/08, [2009] E.C.R. 1-4713;
32-35.
Cofidis SA v. Fredout, Case C-473/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-10,875,
70. See, e.g., Rampion v. Franfinance SA, Case C,429/05, [2007] E.C.R. 1-8017, 11
60-65 (holding that national courts must be able, of their own motion, to raise
consumer claims arising under Directive 87/102 on consumer credit purchases).
71. See Mostaza Claro, [2006] E.C.R. 1-10,421, 40.
72. See id. 35.
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for itself which EU law norms attain the status of a fundamental
right for these purposes.
The Court in Mostaza Claro did not assert that all EU law
norms constitute public policy for purposes of the annulment of
arbitral awards. As noted, it specifically characterized Article 6(1)
of Directive 93/13 as "mandatory."13 However, Article 6(1) did
not by its own terms declare itself to be mandatory. Rather, the
Court merely inferred that conclusion from "l[t]he nature and
importance of the public interest underlying the protection
which the Directive confers on consumers."
The Mostaza Claro judgment clearly signals the Court of
Justice's readiness to determine on a field-by-field, and possibly
on an enactment-by-enactment, basis whether the public interest
underlying an EU law norm has "the nature and importance"
sufficient to justify its violation being treated as necessarily a
violation of EU public policy. That is a problematic exercise on
its own terms, especially since the factors cited by the Court in
reaching that conclusion-namely, the mandatory nature of the
norm, its corresponding to a task of the EU enumerated in
Article 3 of the then EC Treaty (in particular, the task of raising
the standard of living and quality of life), and the importance of
the underlying public interest-are potentially very widely
applicable across EU law.75 Indeed, the principles of
proportionality and subsidiarity suggest that no EU legislative
norm should even exist on a given subject unless it is an
important one from the point of view of achieving the EU's
objectives and one that the Member States are incapable of
effectively addressing themselves at the national level.76 In any
event, the greater the ease with which the Court of Justice
concludes that an EU law norm is "mandatory," as that term is
used in Mostaza Claro, the greater the likely intrusion on Member
States' freedom to determine for themselves the content of
public policy. It should be remembered that the role of public
policy as a legal concept is hardly limited to the annulment and
recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards. It is pervasive of a
73. See id. 1 36.
74. Id. 1 38.
75. See id. 1136-38.
76. See generally George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the
European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 331 (1994).
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legal system, barring the enforcement of otherwise applicable
legal norms and decisions across the board.77
However, this Essay has a more focused concern, namely,
the impact of EU public policy on the law and practice of
international arbitration. It is virtually an article of faith that
international arbitral awards are presumptively enforceable,7 8
that the role of courts in arbitration is not to correct errors of
fact or of law,79 and that the grounds for annulling or denying
recognition or enforcement of awards-including the public
policy exception-are to be narrowly construed.8 0 EU public
policy undoubtedly has its place under the public policy umbrella
that informs decisions of Member State courts on the annulment
and denial of recognition or enforcement of awards. But that
place needs definition, and it is the Court of Justice's
responsibility to provide it.
This conclusion is only reinforced by the Court of Justice's
more recent ruling in Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v. Rodriguez
Nogueira.8 ' The facts in that case were essentially comparable to
those in Mostaza Claro, subject to what turned out to be, in the
Court's view, a critical distinction: in Asturcom, the consumer did
not participate to any extent in the proceedings, and a final
award ensued.8 2 Nor did the consumer take any action to have
the resulting award annulled. Rather, the claimant telecom
company sought the award's enforcement in a Spanish court,
prompting a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice.8 3 (It
does not appear from the Court's judgment that the consumer
even mounted a defense to the enforcement action in national
court.)8 4

77. See generally Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, "PublicPolicy" in the Conflict
of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969 (1956).
78. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 56, § 5-6 (a) & cmt. a; see also BORN, supra note 41,
at 2711.
79. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 56, § 5-6 cmt. c; see also BORN, supra note 41, at
2712-17, 2721-22, 2730-34, 2841-51.
80. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 56, § 5-14 cmts. a & b; see also BORN, supra note
41, at 2625-28, 2841-51.
81. Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v. Rodriguez Nogueira, Case C40/08,
[2009] E.C.R. 1-9579.
82. See id. 133.
24-27.
83. See id.
84. See id. I 22-23.
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The Court of Justice once again analyzed the case in terms
of both the principle of effectiveness and the principle of
equivalence. Regarding the former, it found that Spanish law had
offered the consumer the possibility of seeking the award's
annulment and had given her a sufficiently long limitation
period in which to do So.85 It concluded in effect that requiring
the Spanish court, under those circumstances, to abandon its
principles on a matter as important as res judicata in order to
make EU law marginally more effective would impose too great a
price in terms of Member States' basic procedural autonomy.8 6
Analysis under the principle of equivalence proved more
difficult. On the one hand, the Court squarely held that if a
Spanish court would assess of its own motion whether an
arbitration clause conflicts with national rules of public policy,
notwithstanding a party's failure to raise the issue at any stage,
then it must be no less willing to do so in regard to EU rules of
public policy.8 7 The Court reiterated in this connection that
Article 6(1) was both a "mandatory provision" and one that "is
essential to the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the
European Community and, in particular, to raising the standard
of living and the quality of life throughout the Community."8 8
Once again, due to "the nature and importance of the public
interest underlying the protection" afforded by Directive 93/13,
Article 6(1) had to be treated as the equivalent of national rules
of public policy. 9 The national court in Asturcom needed only to
confirm that, as appeared to be the case, Spanish courts would
deny enforcement of an arbitral award on national public policy
grounds under the circumstances presented in Asturcom.90
From a general EU law point of view, the Asturcomjudgment
demonstrates the Court's recognition that, for all the demands it
imposes on Member State law, the principle of effectiveness does
have its limits in terms of its ability to compromise Member

85. See id.
39-47.
86. See id. 9 37-46.
87. See id.
51-54.
88. Id. 151.
89. Id. 52 ("Article 6 of the directive must be regarded as a provision of equal
standing to national rules which rank, within the domestic legal system, as rules of
public policy.").
90. See id.
55-56.
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States' procedural autonomy.9 ' But even if the principle of
effectiveness does not in itself require a national court to raise
sua sponte the unfairness of a consumer contract term under a
given set of circumstances, the principle of equivalence may do
so. All that need be shown is that the particular remedy in
question is one that the national court would afford if national
public policy were at stake.9 2
Given the breadth of EU law, and the potential for any
branch of it to deserve public policy status in the eyes of the
Court of Justice, Member State courts will frequently confront
the question of the reach of EU public policy. 93 A Member State
court may even feel obliged to raise that question if no litigant
before it does. Questions concerning EU public policy abound.
Surely not every EU law will necessarily receive public policy
status. 4 But do the cases canvassed in this Essay suggest that at
least all of EU consumer protection law has that status? 95 If
consumer protection law, like competition law, has achieved that
status, has EU environmental protection law, labor law, or
occupational health and safety law done so as well? The contours
91. See id. 1 38-48.
92. Id. 11 52-54.
93. See Hanna Schebesta, Does the National Court Know European Law? A Note on Ex

Officio Application afterAsturcom, 4 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 847, 864-70 (2010).
94. In Van der Weerd v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit, Joined
Cases C-222-25/05, [2007] E.C.R. 1-4233, the Court determined that a national court is
not required to raise on its own motion arguments based on an alleged violation of
Directive 85/511 governing measures to control foot-and-mouth disease. According to
the Court:
[T] he principle of effectiveness does not, in circumstances such as those which
arise in the main proceedings, impose a duty on national courts to raise a plea
based on a Community provision of their own motion, irrespective of the
importance of that provision to the Community legal order, where the parties are

given a genuine opportunity to raise a plea based on Community law before a
national court.
Id. 1 41 (emphasis added). For the Court, clearly, not all provisions of EU law provisions
have the same "importance ... to the Community legal order." Id.
95. In Ingmar GB Ltd. v. Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc., Case C-381/98, [2000]

E.C.R. 1-9305, the Court held that a Member State court must disregard a choice of US
law in a commercial agency contract if the effect of applying the chosen law would be to
deprive a commercial agent of rights under Directive 86/653 on Protection of SelfEmployed Commercial Agents. It described the directive's protections as "mandatory,"
explaining that "it is essential for the Community legal order that a principal established
in a non-member country, whose commercial agent carries on his activity within the
Community, cannot evade those provisions by the simple expedient of a choice-of-law
clause." Id. 15 21, 25.
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of EU public policy remain undefined and the Court ofJustice is
unlikely to render them definite any time soon.
Exaggerated notions of public policy pose a particular threat
to international arbitration on account of their assumed
nonwaivability. The efficiency of international arbitration
requires that parties bring their legal claims-procedural and
substantive alike-before arbitral tribunals rather than reserve
them for eventual judicial challenges to unfavorable awards. The
threat of waiver in arbitration serves the generally salutary
purpose of inducing parties to raise those claims on a timely
basis. But it cannot continue to do so unless the public policy
defense, even under the potent influence of EU law, is used
sparingly.
III. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
Even more conspicuous developments in the relationship
between EU law and international arbitration are taking place in
the foreign direct investment arena.9 6 Here too, it is not too early
to contemplate the consequences of these developments, though
it is entirely too early to gauge their magnitude.
Traditionally, foreign investment law and policy were not
considered to fall within the scope of the EU's common
commercial policy-a domain in which the EU, exceptionally,
has enjoyed competence exclusive of the Member States.97 The
EU accordingly could neither legislate within the field nor enter
into international agreements, whether in the form of bilateral
investment treaties ("BITs") or otherwise. The arbitration activity
resulting from the BITs was therefore also not, in principle, of
EU concern.
This, of course, did not mean that a Member State's conduct
in the foreign direct investment field could not run afoul of EU
laws because Member States may not act in any field in a way that
offends applicable EU law and policy.9 8 Thus the Commission
brought infringement proceedings against Austria, Finland, and
Sweden on account of provisions in their BITs that the
96. See infra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
97. See TFEU, supra note 1, art. 3(1) (e), 2010 0.J. C 83, at 51 (making the common
commercial policy an exclusive Union competence); see also BERMANN ET AL., supra note

24, at 1091-94, 1181-82.
98. See Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585.
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Commission thought incompatible with EU law, and the Court of
Justice upheld the Commission's contention in each
proceeding.9 9 The Court held that these BITs' guarantees of the
free and immediate transfer, in freely convertible currencies, of
all payments due in connection with investments were
incompatible with then EC Treaty Articles 57(2), 59, and
60(1),100 which entitled the Council of the European Union
("Council") under stated circumstances to restrict the free
movement of capital and payments between Member States and
third countries.' 0 ' The defendant states were found to have failed
in their obligations under EC Treaty Article 307(2)102 by not
taking steps to eliminate the incompatibility. 0 - Thus, even if
foreign investment law did not as such fall within the Union's
competence, actions taken by the Member States in pursuance of
that reserved competence could run afoul of general EU law
principles.
A.

EU Competence over ForeignDirectInvestment

Change, however, is afoot. The Treaty of Lisbon now gives
the EU a central-indeed the central-role in foreign direct
investment law and policy. Indeed, it brings foreign direct
investment squarely within the scope of the common commercial
policy, a domain in which the EU already enjoyed exclusive
competence. 0 4 It is not yet entirely clear how the EU will exercise

99. Commission v. Austria, [2009] E.C.R. 1-1301, 1 45; Commission v. Sweden,
[2009] E.C.R. 1-1335, 1 45; Commission v. Finland, [2009 E.C.R. 1-10,889, 1 50.
100. Pursuant to the Treaty of Lisbon, these provisions, essentially unchanged, are
now found in Articles 64, 66, and 75, respectively, of the TFEU. See TFEU, supra note 1,
arts. 64, 66, & 75, 2010 0.J. C 83, at 72-73, 75.
101. Austria, [2009] E.C.R. 1-1301, 1J 35-43; Sweden, [2009] E.C.R. 1-1335, 1 3638-43.
43; Finland, [2009] E.C.R. 1-10,889,
102. This provision is now found in Article 351 of the TFEU. See TFEU, supra note
1, art. 351, 2010 0.J. C 83, at 196.
45;
45; Sweden, [2009] E.C.R. 1-1335,
103. See Austria, [2009] E.C.R. 1-1301,
Finland,[2009] E.C.R. 1-10,889, 50.
104. See TFEU, supra note 1, art. 3(1)(e), 2010 0.J. C 83, at 51 (making the
common commercial policy an exclusive Union competence); id. art. 207, at 140-41
(making foreign direct investment a component of the common commercial policy).
TFEU Article 207(1) reads, in pertinent part, "The common commercial policy shall be
based on uniform principles, particularly with regard to ... commercial aspects of ...
foreign direct investment." Id. art. 207(1), at 140. Article 2(1) of the TFEU defines
"exclusive competence" as meaning that "only the Union may legislate and adopt legally
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that competence,1 05 or the extent to which it will authorize
Member States-as it may under EU constitutional law' 0 6-to
continue acting within that sphere. But one can be sure that the
EU will do a great deal more than police the Member States'
BITs from the sidelines. Debate over a model EU BIT is already
well underway,1 0 7 and existing Member State BITs may be
terminated or phased out.108 Moreover, at least in the
Commission's view, the EU (represented by the Commission) will
not merely defend the actions of the EU institutions if
challenged in investment disputes but will also be the sole
defendant when Member State measures become the subject of

binding acts, the Member States being able to do so themselves only if so empowered by
the Union or for the implementation of Union acts." Id. art. 2(1), at 50.
105. In July 2010, the Commission issued a proposed regulation establishing
transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States
and third countries. See Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a
Regulation of the Parliament and Council Establishing Transitional Arrangements for
Bilateral Investment Agreements between Member States and Third Countries, COM
(2010) 344 Final (July 2010). The proposal, while affirming the Union's exclusive
competence, contemplates that the EU may authorize Member States to keep in place
existing BITs and even negotiate and enter into new

ones,

but only subject to

Commission approval. The Commission may deny or revoke authorizations if it finds in
the agreements incompatibilities with EU law, overlap with existing EU agreements with
third countries, or obstacles to the development and implementation of an EU
investment policy. To this end, Member States would have to submit the texts of
proposed new BITs to the Commission for review prior to signature. See id. at 2; see also
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards
a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy, COM (2010) 343 Final
(July 2010) [hereinafter Commission FDI Communication]. See generally Markus
Burgstaller, European Law and Investment Treaties, 26 J. INT'L ARB. 181 (2009); Marc
Bungenberg, Centralizing European BIT Making under the Lisbon Treaty (2008)
(paper presented at the 2008 Biennial Interest Group Conference, Washington, D.C.,
available at http://www.asil.org/files/ielconferencepapers/
Nov. 13-15, 2008),
bungenberg.
106. The EU's exclusive competence does not in principle bar it from authorizing
continuing Member State activity in the field in question. See generally KOEN LENAERTS &
PIET VAN NUFFEL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (Robert Bray ed., 2d
ed. 2005).
107. See Armand de Mestral, Is a Model EU BIT Possible-orEven Desirable?, COLUM.
FDI PERSP. (Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/vcc/0018506/LO 018506
15859.pdf.
108. See Commission FDI Communication, supra note 105, at 5. The Commission
estimates that Member States have entered into a total nearing 1200 BITs, which
collectively account for almost half of the world's investment agreements currently in
force. See id. at 4.
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investment arbitration claims by investors within a Member State
coming from third countries.10 9
B.

Investor-State ArbitralAwards in Member State Courts

This Essay, however, is not concerned so much with
reconfigurations of competence within the EU for making and
enforcing foreign investment law, important though that may be
for the balance of power within the EU. It focuses instead on the
impact that this shift may have on investment arbitration. With
the conferral of exclusive EU competence in the foreign direct
investment area will come not only authority to make new
international agreements for the protection of investment and to
occupy the front line in defending investment treaty claims, but
also authority to elaborate autonomous foreign direct investment
principles and policies, the content and strength of which cannot
yet be known. According to the Commission, the EU will, among
other things, seek to harmonize the level of protection that EU
investors receive when investing abroad, while formulating
investment principles that will allow it to take account of the
political, institutional, and economic circumstances in particular
countries.110 The Commission also expects to address other
outward investment issues like market access, repatriation of
profits, and protection of intellectual property rights. Meanwhile,
policy on inward investment will be driven by considerations of
job creation, resource allocation, and effects on trade and
competition. To these and other ends, new legislation at the EU
level is contemplated.-"
It is not too soon to recognize that Member State judiciaries
may come to face dilemmas created by conflicting signals from
the New York Convention and International Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes on the one hand and the
foreign direct investment law and policy of the EU on the other.
As noted, the demands that EU law has imposed thus far in the
foreign investment field have been mostly marginal.112 But as
substantive EU policies in the field take shape, Member State
judges will experience greater demands emanating from EU law.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See id. at 10.
See id. at 7.
See id. at 10.
See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
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The Commission has certainly taken the view that EU law prevails
over any nonconforming BIT norm, and recent Court of Justice
rulings, at least to some extent, support that position." 3
The arbitration-related question that now presents itself
merges with the public policy question discussed earlier in this
Essay. At least outside the context of the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)-in which courts
have neither the possibility to annul awards nor to refuse their
recognition or enforcement' '4-investor-state
awards are as
susceptible to annulment or denials of recognition and
enforcement as any other species of international arbitral awards.
The Member State courts before which these cases arise once
again face two sets of imperatives: those flowing from their
obligation to uphold, recognize, and enforce awards absent a
good reason to do otherwise under prevailing arbitration treaties
or statutes; and those flowing from their obligations to comply
with all of European Union law. One does not know the
likelihood of investor protection policy attaining the status that
competition and consumer protection policy apparently enjoy
within the hierarchy of EU legal norms; it need not, and, for the
sake of the international law system, probably should not. But the
answer to that question ultimately stands to determine whether
and to what extent investor-state awards will run into difficulties
in Member State courts.
CONCLUSION
Real connections are beginning to develop between EU law
and international arbitration law-domains that for decades have
pursued their own courses without much involvement of the
other. The new fault lines, however, are only barely visible. The
potential for notions of EU public policy, as elaborated by the
Court of Justice, to render international arbitral awards more
broadly susceptible to annulment, nonrecognition, and
nonenforcement is already well documented in competition law
and consumer protection fields. The only question is how far that

113. See, e.g., Kadi v. Council and Commission, Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C415/05 P, [2008] E.C.R. 1-6351.
114. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, Oct. 17, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, arts. 52-53.
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potential will develop and what its impact on international
commercial arbitration will be.
In some respects, the Lisbon Treaty's expansion of the EU's
exclusive competence over common commercial policy to
include foreign investment is surer to bring about change. The
EU stands to become the master of bilateral investment treaties
within the European arena and the protagonist in defending
claims arising out of inward investment. That alone is of
moment. More speculative, but also more intriguing, is the
question whether foreign investment law's having become EU
law and EU law's claiming primacy over national law may
ultimately subject Member State judges to demands from the
Court of Justice that fit imperfectly with the demands of
international arbitration law that they are long accustomed to
respecting.

